By: Joshua Plaschkes

The recent assertion by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, that the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency is directly linked to the Haqqani network’s attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and the truck bomb at a NATO outpost in the south of Kabul, is a truly disturbing revelation. This is the boldest statement by a U.S. official about Pakistan’s involvement with terrorist organizations since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. Essentially, what Admiral Mullen’s statement is saying is Pakistan, our supposed ally in the war on terror, is actively conducting acts of war against the U.S. through their operational cooperation with the Haqqani network, killing U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan. This is unacceptable, especially since the U.S. provides more than $200 billion annually in military aid to Pakistan. Although Admiral Mullen and other U.S. officials have ratcheted up the public condemnation of the ISI’s links to the Haqqani network, all sides agree that U.S.-Pakistani relations are essential and need to be strengthened. The question is how should the U.S. deal with the ISI’s ties to the Haqqani network, while rebuilding U.S.-Pakistani relations?

First, it is important to understand a little background about the Haqqani network. The founder of the Haqanni network, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is a Jadran tribesman from the Afghan Pakita province. He owns property in neighboring Waziristan, which is where the organization is thought to be centralized, although Haqqani has stated that they have moved inside Taliban controlled parts of Afghanistan. During the Cold War, Jalaluddin was an ally of the U.S. in its fight against the Soviets and was a top commander of the Pakistani ISI. Although, Pakistan says that there is not longer any contact between Haqqani and the ISI, many speculate that he is still an ISI asset. At the very least, it shows deep ties between the two organizations. Once the U.S. began the bombing campaign in Afghanistan, Haqqani set up militant camps in Northern Waziristan in order to fight against coalition troops, creating a safe haven for groups such as the Punjab Taliban. The Haqqani network and its terrorist affiliates are followers of the Taliban’s spiritual leader, Mullah Omar. Currently Jalaluddin’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is leading the network and is seen as the organizations chief negotiator, uniting various Pakistani militant groups. Sirajuddin is also linked to the December 2009 suicide attack in Afghanistan’s Khost province, which killed seven C.I.A operatives. Although, there have been brief negotiations between the Pakistani government and the Haqqani network, they continue to fail. Recently, the Haqqani network is thought to be behind the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council and a former Afghan President. The recent truck bombing at the NATO outpost killed five people and wounded seventy seven, while the U.S. Embassy assault killed sixteen Afghan police officers and civilians. These assassinations and attacks on U.S. installations are seen as an effort to disrupt the progress made by the U.S. resulting from the surge. Although the U.S. is actively pursuing the Haqqani network, they are needed in order to broker a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Pakistani officials, such as Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, have been adamant that the ISI is not working with the Haqqani network. They point to the fact that the Pakistani military has been conducting operations against terrorist organizations within the country and continue to suffer large amounts of casualties. Terrorist organizations continue to attack military posts and target key leaders in the Pakistani government. The Pakistani leadership believes that Admiral Mullen and other U.S. officials remarks are a sign of frustration from failed U.S. policies in the region and state that they have offered no evidence to substantiate their claims. Yet, in June 2008, intercepted communications from ISI officers showed that the ISI was behind the bombing of the Indian embassy. What the international community needs to remember is Pakistan is still feeling sore after the Bin Laden raid in Abbotabad Pakistan. This, along with the several successful terrorist attacks that followed the Bin Laden raid, have shown a significant weakness in the Pakistani military and has raised concerns within Pakistan over their ability to protect the nation’s sovereignty. Pakistani officials see Admiral Mullen, Director of the C.I.A General David Petreus, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s recent statements concerning the link between the ISI and the Haqqani network as tools for expanding drone strikes within the country and opens the door for ground troops to cross the Afghan border to take the fight to the Haqqani network in Northern Waziristan. U.S. officials believe the reason for Pakistan’s use of the Haqqani network is to hedge their bets for when the U.S. military leaves Afghanistan and to reassert their power in what they see as a regional imbalance. The Haqqani network offers Pakistan the ability to extend its influence into Afghanistan and shape the future of the country. Although U.S. officials have repeatedly asked the Pakistani military to go after the Haqqani network, they continue to refuse.

The U.S. cannot continue to support an organization that is actively assisting in the killing of U.S. and coalition troops, so what are the options for the United States? As previously stated, the U.S. could continue the drone strike campaign, which has been incredibly effective in taking out high value targets without endangering U.S. troops. Now that General Petraeus is the new director of the C.I.A, it is very likely that drone strikes, which were used extensively in Afghanistan under his leadership, will be used more heavily in Pakistan. Placing ground forces within Pakistan would be a big step in fighting the Haqqani network, but has the risk of placing U.S. soldiers at risk, opening up a new war front at a time when the U.S. is trying to reduce the amount of troops in the region, and completely disintegrating the already fragile U.S.-Pakistani relationship. If the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan completely break down, the Pakistanis could turn completely to the more extremist elements within the country and seek the support of anti-Western nations, such as Iran. This would be incredibly detrimental to U.S. operations in the region and has serious long term implications. Recently, the U.S. has taken a non-military approach in order to put increased pressure on the Pakistani government. The Obama administration has suspended, and in some cases cancelled, up to one third of this years aid to Pakistan. This could affect $800 million in military aid and equipment that the Pakistani military requires for counterterrorism operations. The move was used to stop Pakistan’s expulsion of U.S. military trainers from the country and put pressure on the Pakistani military to fight militants more effectively. Of the three options, using economics is the least risky and may be the best option because it is conditions based. If the Pakistanis want the military aid, they need to show a willingness to take the fight to the Haqqani network and other terrorist organizations that are located within Pakistan and cross into Afghanistan to fight U.S. troops. Therefore, the best options for moving forward should be to used conditions based aid for the military, while still supporting domestic projects that will help the Pakistani civilians, while continuing drone strikes in Northern Waziristan to directly target the Haqqani network. The insertion of ground troops should be the last option if further revelations reveal substantial evidence that the Pakistani ISI is actively supporting the Haqqani network to attack U.S. troops and instillations. Everything should be done to strengthen the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, but it does not make sense to give aid to an organization that we are also fighting. It is up to the Pakistani government and military to decide what direction they wish to go in and what consequences they are willing to take for their actions.