When it comes to current Net neutrality issues, the public debate swings predominantly between two different regulatory strategies (known as, Title II and Section 706), both to be administered by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Yet, as much as we concern ourselves with better definitions and the right regulations, we should be more concerned with getting the right regulator. Among those in technology policy, many highlight the benefits of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) antitrust regulation as the better means to address Net neutrality issues.
The FCC has spent more than a decade grabbing for authority to claim jurisdiction over Internet network providers, yet the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit continues to rule against such attempts. Earlier this year on January 14th in Verizon v. FCC, D.C. Circuit vacated two-thirds of the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order. While upholding the “transparency” rule as within the FCC’s current authority, the “no blocking” and “no unreasonable discrimination” rules were found to only apply to “common carriers.” Since the FCC had previously classified broadband providers as “information services,” many proponents of Net neutrality are prompting the FCC to simply reclassify these providers as “common carriers,” so these rules, if not stricter ones, can apply.
Once a “common carrier,” the FCC could regulate under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which brings about a host of antiquated legal unpleasantries. Yet, some suggest that the FCC could rather regulate the Internet as a “common carrier” under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 instead, while avoiding 80 years regulatory and judiciary baggage.
Either way, more litigation will be the storied future of the Internet. Under Title II, the courts will decide what outmoded rules and regulations the FCC can forbear and which ones they cannot. And under Section 706, the courts will establish the boundaries to the presently board and ill-defined regulatory language.
Some argue the Internet was never neutral, so to now forcibly try and create that which never was seems futile at best and damning at worst. Nevertheless, in his book, The Dynamic Internet: How Technology, Users, and Businesses are Transforming the Network, Christopher S. Yoo, a University of Pennsylvania Law Professor, writes,
“Setting aside whether the above accurately describes the Internet when it first emerged as a mass-market phenomenon, the policy debate has largely overlooked the extent to which the technological and economic environments surrounding the Internet have changed since the mid-1990s.”
The Internet is a dynamic ecosystem, evolving, expanding, and diversifying as it develops. And herein lies the problem: FCC’s regulations are designed for a static, mature network, and the Internet is all but.
The myriad downsides of the FCC reclassifying Internet network providers as “common carriers” can be avoided by better understanding the earnest concerns people have. Most prevalent is the fear of monopoly power being exercised and therefore distorting the freedom inborn in cyberspace.
As FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright explains,
“At its heart, the net neutrality debate concerns the competitive effects of vertical contractual arrangements between broadband providers and content providers. Put another way, net neutrality is about the fear that broadband providers will enter into business arrangements that disadvantage certain content providers, harm competition, and thereby leave consumers worse off.”
With the FTC’s unique history and set of tools to handle anticompetitive behavior and practices, consumers and innovation can be protected from harmful abuses. The FTC’s “rule of reason” analytical framework evaluates individually each case of potential abuse to gauge the costs and benefits to consumer welfare. Moreover, from this “error-cost” approach, FTC acts accordingly.
“The Net Neutrality Order clearly does consumers a disservice by employing an overly rigid, one size fits all, categorical ban on broadband providers’ ability to enter into vertical contractual arrangements that are potentially—if not probably—efficiency enhancing.”
“Indeed, the economic literature,” Wright continues, “is replete with procompetitive explanations for vertical contracts.”
The FCC’s practice of harmonizing content and generalizing rules and regulations does not fit with the rapidly evolving ecology of the Internet. The “one-size-fits-all approach,” writes Yoo, “that dominates the current debate misses the mark. On the contrary, the architecture of the future is likely to be more dynamic and heterogeneous.”
With its highly industry-specific analyses, FTC can tackle more efficiently and more effectively any harmful anticompetitive practices when they occur, while allowing for an innovative environment for both individuals and businesses to flourish.
With the public debate over Net neutrality constricted to only a few rules and regulations by the mainstream media pundits, viral YouTube videos, and late night comedians, we need to broaden the scope of the debate, as to discuss, not only the regulations, but who regulates.
Good luck convincing any bureaucratic regulatory agency NOT to use every bit of power that it believes it has been granted. The ruling in Verizon v. FCC, which Verizon foolishly did not petition to have reviewed en banc by the entire Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, left the Commission with the impression that if it worded its regulations in just the right way, it could regulate the whole Internet. It has since been considering every possible way to do so, imperiling small companies that can’t afford regulation as well as the consumers that patronize them. The result, if the FCC is successful, will be a telco/cable duopoly and high regulatory barriers against any other would-be provider.
Pingback: The Evening Post: Net Neutrality: Is the Internet a Public Utility | Geek Alabama
I think the premise of this article is flawed.
The main risk is not that broadband ISPs “enter into business arrangements that disadvantage certain content/app providers”. There is little to suggest any willingness of other parties to enter into such arrangements, or that they can be made to work technically with requisite finesse.
The risks are either that broadband ISPs unilaterally & deliberately disadvantage certain providers (eg by blocking or deliberate degradation of traffic), or that they essentially extort such business arrangements through pricing or technical artifice.
The other issue unexplored here is around timescales – such anticompetitive behaviour could cause material impacts to companies in hours or days, yet any FTC-type adjudications might take months or years.
This model could possibly work, if there were 24×7 tribunals that could address concerns immediately – and also ability for consumers to switch broadband providers instantly if network policies change. One option may be to only apply Neutrality laws to those users who have fewer than, say, five comparable competing providers to choose from.