Executive Summary:

• U.S. non-ratification of UNCLOS preserves regulatory autonomy by avoiding key obligations under Article 82 and the International Seabed Authority (ISA), including revenue-sharing requirements for extended continental shelf exploitation and deep-seabed mining.
• However, non-ratification prevents the United States from submitting Arctic continental shelf claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), limiting formal recognition of its seabed entitlements relative to Russia, which actively uses UNCLOS institutions to advance its Arctic claims.
• Overall, U.S. non-ratification reflects a tradeoff between domestic regulatory flexibility and institutional legitimacy in Arctic seabed competition, with a slightly favorable net effect on U.S. strategic positioning relative to Russia in terms of regulatory autonomy, despite meaningful losses in institutional legitimacy.

Introduction:

The Arctic seabed is emerging as a strategic frontier for resource competition as climate change expands access to previously inaccessible offshore reserves. As this shift accelerates, Arctic governance is increasingly structured by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which governs continental shelf claims and seabed resource jurisdiction.

Russia has leveraged its extensive Arctic coastline and sustained engagement with UNCLOS procedures to advance expanded continental shelf claims, strengthening its strategic position in the region. In contrast, the United States has not formally ratified UNCLOS, despite generally adhering to its provisions as customary international law, creating a divergence between legal compliance and formal institutional participation.

This paper evaluates whether U.S. non-ratification of UNCLOS strengthens or weakens its strategic position in Arctic seabed competition relative to Russia. It focuses on the tradeoff between institutional influence over maritime rules and strategic flexibility outside formal treaty constraints in an era of rising great-power competition in the Arctic.

Benefits of Non-Ratification:

Ratification of UNCLOS would impose two key obligations on the United States: Article 82 revenue-sharing requirements and compliance with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) regime. Article 82 requires coastal states to make payments or contributions in kind when extracting non-living resources from their extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their coastline. This would require the United States to make revenue-sharing payments resembling royalties on offshore oil and critical mineral extraction. It also imposes revenue-sharing obligations on Russia’s own extended continental shelf production. However, for Russia, these obligations are outweighed by the benefits of UNCLOS, which provides a legal framework for recognizing its extensive Arctic continental shelf claims. Russia has claimed approximately 1.79 million square kilometers of Arctic seabed, substantially more than the United States estimated 1 million square kilometers. Also, it must be noted that article 82 payments start only after the first five years of production and gradually rise to a maximum of 7%.

Second, UNCLOS would place the United States under the authority of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for deep-seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction. The ISA regulates exploration and development while requiring the sharing of mining revenues, limiting company autonomy. One of the primary reasons Ronald Reagan opposed U.S. ratification during the treaty’s negotiation was the ISA’s revenue-sharing requirements. Instead, U.S. entities operate under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, allowing them to conduct deep-seabed mining without paying ISA fees or participating in mandatory revenue redistribution. This provides a regulatory advantage relative to Russia under the ISA framework. Although Russia benefits from UNCLOS by expanding its continental shelf claims in the Arctic, any mining activities it conducts beyond national jurisdiction remain subject to ISA regulations, including benefit-sharing obligations. Because the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, U.S. entities operating under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act are not subject to those same ISA requirements.

Costs of non-ratification:

While non-ratification preserves regulatory flexibility, it also imposes significant strategic costs in Arctic seabed competition. Most importantly, the United States cannot submit extended continental shelf claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), limiting its ability to secure formal international recognition of its Arctic seabed entitlements. UNCLOS provides a structured legal framework for evaluating and legitimizing overlapping continental shelf claims, including those between the United States and Russia in the Arctic, thereby reducing uncertainty and reliance on bilateral political negotiation.

Although the United States may possess a substantial extended continental shelf off Alaska, UNCLOS serves as the primary mechanism through which geological potential is translated into internationally recognized sovereign rights. Russia’s sustained engagement with UNCLOS institutions, including its submissions to the CLCS, illustrates how ratifying states can use the treaty framework to strengthen the legal basis of their Arctic claims. As a result, U.S. non-participation limits access to key institutional processes that confer legal legitimacy and procedural clarity in overlapping seabed disputes, potentially placing it at a disadvantage in long-term Arctic resource competition.

Institutional Legitimacy in Practice:

Although enforcement under UNCLOS remains a challenge because international law lacks a centralized enforcement mechanism, compliance among member states is generally high. This compliance appears to stem less from coercive enforcement and more from the value states place on UNCLOS as a predictable and widely accepted framework for resolving maritime disputes and establishing legal rights. At the same time, the ISA’s regulatory regime continues to evolve. For instance, the ISA Mining Code is still being finalized, with some member states advocating for a precautionary pause on commercial deep-sea mining amid ongoing disagreements over the appropriate regulatory framework. Nevertheless, participation in the UNCLOS framework continues to confer legal and diplomatic advantages. While Russia’s strained relations with many Western countries may diminish some of the practical benefits of international recognition, its participation in UNCLOS still strengthens the legal legitimacy of its Arctic continental shelf claims and enhances its position in future negotiations with states that continue to rely on the Convention’s framework. For example, despite Russia’s war in Ukraine and resulting international isolation, the UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) issued recommendations in 2023 that were largely favorable to Russia’s Arctic Ocean submission, supporting portions of its claimed continental shelf extensions in areas including the Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, Podvodnikov Basin, and Lomonosov Ridge.

Conclusion:

Overall, U.S. non-ratification of UNCLOS produces a mixed outcome in Arctic seabed competition with Russia, with a modest net advantage in terms of regulatory autonomy. While non-ratification preserves domestic flexibility by avoiding financial and institutional obligations under Article 82 and the International Seabed Authority framework, it also restricts access to formal mechanisms for validating extended continental shelf claims through the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This creates a structural tradeoff between regulatory independence and international legal legitimacy. On balance, non-ratification better preserves near-term advantages in seabed governance, even as it entails reduced institutional influence over Arctic continental shelf recognition relative to Russia.