By: Glen Johnson

Interpreters of modern Russia find themselves essentially in one of two camps.  The leading school of interpretation in the West is staffed by a sort of psychologist, who interprets Russian foreign policy as a result of lasting anguish from an expropriated imperial inheritance.  The picture painted by this curious blend of psychoanalyst and policy wonk is one of a hobbled superpower haunted by memories of its past glory and trapped in a sort of nineteenth-century “Great Game” mentality, unable to operate effectively with the new currency of contemporary diplomacy.  Proponents of this theory often see only two options in approaching Russia: first is a sort of coddling designed to nurture a wounded pride.  The other approach is a hardline confrontational attitude that forces them to yield on what the West sees as unreasonable demands.

Then there’s a minority that says Russia is not that much different than many other states, and its actions and interests are largely rational.  As such, it can be engaged through regular diplomacy and will respond based on practical interest.

The Georgian War of 2008 is seen by representatives of these two theories in very different lights.  Daniel Treisman and Andrei Shleifer,  adherents to the minority viewpoint, noted in an article for Foreign Affairs that what was truly remarkable was the limited nature of Russia’s engagement: it did not annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia, seize Tbilisi, or even take control of Georgian oil and gas pipelines.  Clearly, they reasoned, this was a rational actor at work with limited aims.

Today at the Heritage Foundation I attended the talk on the Georgian war.  The speakers were decidedly in the “psychological camp” (aside from Colonel Hamilton, whose remarks were limited largely to a technical overview of the Russian attack).  Georgian Ambassador Temuri Yakobashvili posited the war as a symbolic attack against a country that wanted westernization.  Dr. Ariel Cohen asserted that Russia is likely waiting for its chance to misbehave again, and speculated that the 2012 election season could be its perfect opportunity.  Of course, why Russia would need to wait for us to be distracted was not explained, which is puzzling given our low level of economic interconnectedness and ability to influence events  in that part of the world.

The current reset offers an empirical background against which the merits of these two approaches can be evaluated.  It may end up, as seems likely, that the truth lies somewhere in the middle.  But if the reset proves a success, then it shows that Russia is at least mostly a rational partner that operates on considerations of interest.